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Abstract: Local government in New South Wales (NSW) Australia presently faces the prospect radical 
consolidation alongside the implementation of metropolitan-wide governance structures. The 
pervasive modernity of these processes has been couched in the rhetoric of the need to achieve 
‘Global City’ status such that Sydney can compete with other regionally-based centres. However, 
these narratives neglect the historically repetitive nature of these conflicts. Following from an 
account of the city’s early attempts at metropolitan governance, this discussion examines ‘Sydney 
Global City’ as it is portrayed in the advocacy literature exemplified by the work of the increasingly 
influential lobby group, the Committee for Sydney. We then provide an account of contemporary 
processes of state-local relations toward consolidation and metropolitan governance. We argue that 
former iterations of attempted reforms are instructive, particularly in directing attention to the 
institutional sites of conflict away from the economic reductionism of the ‘global cities’ narrative. 
 





Unlike many of its counterparts in Europe, North America and Asia, the Sydney 
Metropolitan Region (SMR) has never been governed as a single municipal entity. Arguably, 
what most people think of as Sydney – the sprawling metropolis stretching from the foot of 
the Blue Mountains in the West to the beaches in the Northeast and Southeast – remains a 
metropolitan region that at present comprises approximately 41 Local Government Areas 
(LGAs). As an element to this, the City of Sydney first incorporated in 1842 under the New 
South Wales Constitution Act 1842 (Bains and Miles 1981: 130) and now centred on the 
Central Business District (CBD) constitutes a small fraction of what is now a conurbation of 
almost 5 million people (SGS 2009). 
Historically, the absence of a single governing structure for Sydney has been deemed 
problematic, particularly in the period 1898-1915. Contemporaneously, this perceived 
inadequacy has again reached a climax. This has been marked with a reforming zeal for 
consolidating many LGAs, alongside renewed attempts to establish a planning authority for 




policy agenda that it has engendered is being driven in large part by the ‘global cities’ 
discourse, in particular the perceived requirement for Sydney to be internationally 
competitive within the Asian hemisphere in the ‘Asian Century’ (see, for example, Australian 
Government 2012). However, we suggest that perceived of only in these terms, attempts to 
achieve sustainable governing structures for Sydney will continue to falter. 
The paper itself is divided into five main parts. Section two provides an account of the 
attempts at achieving metropolitan-wide, ‘Greater Sydney’ governance before 1932. Section 
three fast-forwards to the present and examines Sydney within the contemporary ‘global 
cities’ advocacy literature, in particular the work of the ‘Committee for Sydney’. Section four 
examines the institutional sites of conflict in the present drive for metropolitan reform, 
culminating in the attempt to institute a Greater Sydney Commission (PDE 2015; 2014). We 
observe that the shepherding of public policy toward amalgamation alongside the grasping 
for a Greater Sydney authority conforms rather eerily to earlier iterations of the same and 
that the problematical nature of these processes seems likely to play out in similar ways. By 
way of conclusion section five explores the similarities and differences between the two 
generations of reform processes, arguing that we ought to be cognisant of the interests 
represented at particular sites of institutional conflict rather than accepting that local 
government reforms are merely problems of coordination. 
 
2. Sydney: early attempts at municipal reform 
 
The early history of municipal development in the Sydney region is defined by two salient 
features. First, recalcitrance by the European inhabitants to assume any responsibility for 
local service provision: The desire of the British Government to transplant a colony-wide 
system of local government proved to be a ‘grandiose and ideological scheme’ (Bowman 
1981: 235). Simply stated, the residents of the colony of NSW, who, if they weren’t convicts 
or former convicts, had nevertheless by necessity enjoyed an intimate relationship with the 
colonial government, remained outside incorporated areas that nevertheless could be 
formed quite readily under the ‘permissive system’ that dated from 1858-1906, instead 
allowing the colonial government to provide their basic services (Baines and Miles 1981: 
131). 
Second, after a basic, faltering system of local government had gradually built up under the 
Municipalities Act 1858, toward the closing years of the 19th century particular interests 
sought the incorporation of a greater metropolitan government dating from 1898. 
According to Baines and Miles (1981: 136) the confluence of a pragmatic desire to 
rationalise municipal services, overlain by the aforementioned political ideals gave rise to 
‘[T]hree distinct movements in the Sydney metropolitan area – larger municipalities on the 
grounds of economy or political motives, county councils on the English model and the 
creation of a single metropolitan authority. Further, while ‘[a]ll were termed “Greater 
Sydney” movements … only the third was of any significance’; with the concept of a 
metropolitan region a central driving concept motivating subsequent public policy: 
The theory behind the Greater Sydney movement was that the metropolitan area was a 
distinct region with considerable social and economic unity and should be governed as a 




According to Bains and Miles (1981: 136) the first impetus toward metropolitan government 
for Sydney can be dated from 1898-1900:‘[S]chemes were drafted at the city and suburban 
council level to amalgamate Sydney with contiguous suburbs’ These plans were countered 
with alternative proposals – drafted by council aldermen who stood to lose their positions 
with the ensuing abolition of their areas – for a two-tiered (‘federal’) system of city 
government. Yet the plans faltered: Bains and Miles (1981: 136) commented that ‘[t]he 
supporters … were so opposed in principle that the movement was quickly deadlocked’. 
The second attempt dated from 1912 with the introduction of a Bill in the NSW Legislative 
Assembly by the (then) McGowan Labor Government for a popularly elected convention to 
decide on the form of a greater Sydney authority. The Bill was never passed due to the 
Legislative Assembly not accepting amendments of the Legislative Council. The impasse 
centred on the perceived illegitimacy of such a convention whereby its members would be 
drawn from a parliamentary rather than municipal franchise. Following from this legislative 
impasse, the next year – 1913 – A Royal Commission ‘recommended a bi-zonal or hybrid 
unitary-federal scheme embracing fifty-three local units [where] an inner zone containing 
[the City of] Sydney and twenty two suburban municipalities was to be completely unified 
[and] outer zone units were to be federated’ (Baines and Miles 1981: 137). The plan was to 
consecutively incorporate units from the outer to the inner zone as they developed over 
time, with a completely unified area the eventual result. However, according to Baines and 
Miles (1981, p. 137) the resultant Bill of 1915 was not vigorously prosecuted through the 
Parliament due to the seriousness of the war situation and the fact that the Labor Party was 
divided over the issue of conscription.  
The third attempt at metropolitan government was again pursued by the Labor Party, this 
time by the Lang Government from 1931. This iteration envisioned the consolidation of 
sixty-nine local government units to the west of Sydney into twenty-eight municipalities 
under the umbrella of the Cumberland County Council (then 4,000 square miles with a 
populous of 1,600 000) alongside the creation of a Greater Sydney Council, with the latter 
again based upon a federal design. Again the reforms foundered, again on ‘city-suburban 
disagreement on a suitable form’, with internal wrangling in the Labor Party and the sacking 
of the Lang Government being contributing factors (Baines and Miles 1981, 137). 
It is instructive to note that while the mooted reforms for Sydney described above failed to 
proceed, events across the young nation had borne out that municipal reforms in the 
direction of city government were not impossible. The cities of Melbourne and Geelong had 
previously reached what Baines and Miles (1981, p. 131) labelled ‘status as successful 
municipalities’ by the mid-1850s, just after the State of Victoria was created in 1851 (for an 
account of this, see Bowman 1981). Brisbane achieved metropolitan-wide government in 
1925 (again at the hands of reforming Labor governments, who in 1922 also abolished the 
upper house of the Queensland legislature (Grant, Dollery and Kortt 2015). Thus, in the 
intrinsically competitive context of Australia’s developing federalism Sydney was, 
comparatively speaking, struggling with metropolitan government. We will resume our 
account of this struggle for in due course. For now, we examine the ‘Global City’ thesis with 






3. Sydney Global City 
 
Fast- forwarding to the present day, the rhetoric surrounding ‘Sydney Global City’ has again 
reached a climax not dissimilar in verve and partisanship in the first part of the twentieth 
century. In this context we will examine what we are terming the ‘advocacy literature’, in 
particular that directed toward consolidation and metropolitan-wide governance. Recently, 
a particular advocacy group, the ‘Committee for Sydney’ (CfS) has been dominant in this 
regard. CfS inter alia describes itself as ‘an independent think tank and champion for the 
whole of Sydney, providing thought leadership beyond the electoral cycle’ (CfS 2015a). Its 
Board comprises Lucy Turnbull AO, former Lord Mayor of Sydney; Deputy Chair Philip 
Davies, Director, Infrastructure Advisory, Asia Pacific AECOM; Deputy Chair Sally Loane, CEO 
of the Financial Services Council and former ABC journalist, along with 14 other individuals, 
the majority of whom hail from the corridors of corporate Australia (see CfS 2015b). In 
short, it would not be inaccurate to describe the Committee for Sydney as a ‘top end of 
town’ lobby group. 
The early literature of CfS sought to determine Sydney’s place in the ‘league tables’ of global 
cities. For example, the commissioned report ‘Benchmarking Sydney’ took a familiar 
approach, selecting comparison cities (in this instance Hong Kong, London, Los Angles, New 
York, San Francisco, Shanghai, Singapore, Tokyo and Vancouver) and using 31 indicators for 
five ‘dimensions’ of competitiveness: [i] Governance; [ii] Connectivity; [iii] Enterprise, 
Innovation and Creativity; [iv] Culture and Diversity and [v] Liveability. The comparative and 
competitive ‘four key messages’ for the direction of reform were: ‘Governance [focusing on 
fragmentation] in Sydney is a major obstacle to economic competitiveness’; ‘Connectivity 
[focusing on public transport usage rates, not ICT adoption] is not up to global city 
standards’; ‘There is scope to improve enterprise innovation in Sydney’ and ‘Liveability and 
cultural diversity remain Sydney’s key strengths’ (SGS 2009, iii-iv). In short, a particular 
model of a ‘global city’ was being argued for as an ideal-type for Sydney: One that posits a 
city governed by a single metropolitan authority; where government invests heavily in 
metropolitan public transport, where the same government provides infrastructure to 
facilitate business while at the same time providing the cultural amenities required for a 
global city. 
From 2013 the CfS has been noticeably more active. While space does not permit a forensic 
analysis of all their outputs in this context (for a compendium, see, CfS 2015a) it is worth 
noting the Committee’s self-described relationship with the NSW State Government: ‘The 
NSW government itself has identified the Committee for Sydney as a ‘renewed’ organisation 
and as a trusted policy-rich partner’ (CfS 2013a, 3). Notably, the CfS policy agenda has 
consistently argued for ‘a more strategic local government structure’. For instance, with 
respect to the commencement of the Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP; 
discussed below) it stated: ‘In 2013 we will ensure that the NSW Independent Local 
Government Review leads to radical reform, with fewer, larger, more strategic councils with 
the capacity to manage Sydney’s growth and maximise its opportunities’ (CfS 2013a, 7; 
emphasis added). It is contemporary intergovernmental relations concerning municipal 





4. Contemporary institutional sites of conflict 
 
Contemporary reform processes in Sydney proceed with a sense of urgency and Wagnerian 
drama. Arguably, the issues of local government amalgamation and metropolitan 
governance have dominated public policy discussions. We now turn to examine the 
institutional sites at which these public policy debates have been conducted. 
 
4.1. Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) (2012-13) 
 
The Independent Local Government Review Panel ILGRP was established by the (then) 
Minister of Local Government ‘to draw on independent expertise to help tackle issues and 
identify how councils can best govern and be structured to support the future wellbeing and 
prosperity of NSW communities’ (Page, 2012, 4). The work of the three-person panel was 
embedded in a narrative of economic development, namely ‘the broader objectives of the 
State as outlined in “NSW 2021: A Plan to Make NSW Number One”’ (ILGRP 2014). The 
Terms of Reference (ToRs) directed it to seven ‘Key Actions’ including inter alia developing 
models for structural reform, options for increasing council own-source revenue, alternative 
governance arrangements and more clearly delineating state and local government 
responsibilities (ILGRP 2014). It was also directed to be cognisant of several other 
considerations, the most salient of which was ‘to take into account the Liberal-National’s 
[i.e.: the incumbent government’s] 2011 election policy of ‘no forced amalgamations’ of 
councils (ILGRP 2013).  
The Panel undertook its brief from March 2012 to October 2013, producing a series of 
reports in its 14 months of operation (ILGRP 2013). The ‘Final Report’, ‘Revitalising Local 
Government’ (ILGRP 2013) advanced 65 recommendations. Despite the raft of reforms 
contained therein, both media attention and public policy have subsequently focused upon 
the process of consolidation recommended by the Panel (Grant and Ryan 2014). Under this 
plan, 32 councils in the greater Sydney region would be reduced to approximately 14 and a 
range of structural reforms would be introduced across most of the remainder of the state 
(ILGRP 2013). In essence, the Panel dispensed with the commissioning government’s stated 
policy, arguing that: ‘Sooner or later amalgamations will have to be part of the package: the 
number of councils in NSW has halved during the past century and that trend will surely 
continue’ (ILGRP 2013, 7). 
 
4.2. NSW Government ‘Fit for the Future’ reform program (2014-15) 
 
The ensuing response by the Government – despite its 2011 pre-election pledge – was to 
embrace the recommendations of the Panel with respect to council amalgamation and offer 
a range of financial incentives for select local governments to merge. This package of reform 
options it labelled ‘Fit for the Future’, which it ‘launched’ in September 2014. Under ‘Fit for 
the Future’ all NSW local governments were obliged to submit self-assessments, in the form 




‘Council Merger Proposal’; [ii] ‘Council Improvement Proposal’ (which included the option to 
remain a stand-alone municipal entity) or [iii] the ‘Rural Council Proposal’ (NSW 
Government 2015). The Government was not content with deciding the fate of councils 
itself. On the contrary, it appointed an existing statutory authority – the Independent Pricing 
and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) to assess the proposals of councils. Yet with a seeming 
disregard for IPART’s ‘independence’ it directed the statutory organisation to follow the 
criteria put forward by the ILGRP in terms of ‘scale’ and ‘capacity’, both of which the ILGRP 
(2013, p. 32) had defined broadly, alongside the more economically specific criteria of 
‘sustainability’, ‘effectively managing infrastructure and delivering services for 
communities’; and ‘efficiency’ (see IPART 2015a: 5-6; for a concise discussion, see Grant and 
Campbell 2015). 
 
4.3. Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) (2015) 
 
The IPART acted with an eye to procedural thoroughness and consultation. It called for 
submissions to its proposed methodology for assessing councils on 27 April 2015, to which 
171 submissions were made -- principally by councils, also by other stakeholders including 
inter alia Regional Organisations of Councils (ROCs) political parties (the NSW Greens, for 
example) professional associations and –interestingly – the former Chair of the ILGRP (IPART 
2015a). It also held a schedule of public forums seeking to both explain and receive 
feedback on the methodology throughout May 2015, then released its revised methodology 
on the 5th of June, requiring that all councils submit their proposals by 30 June, and then 
extending this deadline to 31 July (IPART 2015b). By this time it had received 139 
submissions from 144 councils of the 152 councils across the state (some Far West councils 
were not required to submit proposals). Many of the submissions contained multiple 
documents with councils appending other material to the templates provided by the NSW 
Government. Of the submissions received, only four embraced the ‘Council Merger 
Proposal’; all other councils had opted for either the ‘Council Improvement Proposal’ or the 
Rural Council Proposal’ both of which accommodated councils standing alone (IPART 2015c). 
In other words, the recommendations for consolidation put forward by the ILGRP and 
subsequently endorsed by Government in its direction to the IPART, had been 
overwhelmingly rejected by local governments.  
Armed with the council submissions, the IPART released its ‘Assessment of Council Fit for 
the Future (Final Report)’ on 20 October, inclusive of a ‘Consultant Report’ modelling the 
long term economic benefits of the ILGRP’s preferred mergers conducted by Ernst & Young 
(IPART 2015d). Ernst & Young was not requested to model the long term economic benefits 
of ‘Council Improvement Proposals’ (the ‘stand-alone’ option provided for in the ‘Fit for the 
Future’ package) and compare these with the preferred options for mergers – and 
underlined that this was the case in its report (Ernst & Young 2015: 3). Nevertheless, it 
reached two noteworthy conclusions. First, that: ‘[T]he available empirical evidence on the 
extent to which local council amalgamations will yield net savings in costs is mixed and 
tends to vary by activity’, adding that: ‘[e]conometric analysis does not provide strong 
support’. Second, that: ‘[t]here is limited evidence available on the financial costs associated 
with local council amalgamations’ (Ernst & Young 2015: 5). Nevertheless, the evidence 




assessment pointed to the general conclusion that: ‘the costs associated with amalgamation 
are large and often under-estimated, particularly costs associated with new systems, 
cultures and operating structures’. 
With this in mind, in examining Sydney’s councils ‘fitness’ writ large, the IPART ‘Final Report’ 
assessed groups of ‘Inner Metropolitan’ councils clustered in seven geographic regions 
(Inner West, West Central, Lower North Shore, Northern Suburbs, Northern Beaches, South 
West, Southern) and nine ‘Outer Metropolitan Councils’, as well as the City of Sydney. In 
sum, it assessed all ‘Inner Metropolitan’ councils and the City of Sydney as ‘not fit’, while 
the majority (seven) of the nine ‘Outer Metropolitan’ councils as ‘fit’. In the overwhelming 
majority of cases the assessment as ‘not fit’ was based not on the financial situation of 
individual councils – in the overwhelming majority of cases individual councils were 
assessed as financially robust – but on the basis of the more subjective criteria of ‘scale and 
capacity’ (for a concise description, see Grant 2015). It was on this basis that IPART 
recommended that the Inner Metropolitan councils – inclusive of the City of Sydney – be 
amalgamated into the regional groups, while all nine ‘Outer Metropolitan’ councils remain 
‘stand-alone’ councils (see IPART 2015d: 39-60). At the time of writing, councils are 
equivocating whether or not to follow the recommendations (see, for example, McKenny 
2015). 
 
4.4. NSW Legislative Council ‘Local government (Inquiry)’ (2015) 
 
Commensurate with the process of IPART’s deliberations, both political opposition and 
public outcry concerning the remarkably short time frame that councils had to prepare their 
submissions (from 5 June to 30 June; then with a belated extension to 31 July) saw the 
opposition parties combine in the Legislative Council (the Upper House of the NSW 
Parliament) to successfully introduce a Bill for an inquiry into the process. The Inquiry 
commenced 27 May (Legislative Council 2015a) with an expansive ‘Terms of Reference’ 
(ToRs). Many of the ToRs probe the process of reform represented by the reform agenda; 
however, the ToRs also require that the Committee revisit many of the fundamental, or 
what might be termed ‘foundational’ questions concerning local government. For example, 
ToR 1(n) directs the Committee to inquire into ‘protecting and delivering democratic 
structures for local government to ensure it remains close to the people it serves’ 
(Legislative Council 2015b). In essence, the ToRs do not only ask the Committee to inquire 
into both the role of IPART (and by implication, the NSW Government) but to revisit the 
debates about the normative role of local government indicating that it was deeply 
dissatisfied with the processes that the government has hitherto undertaken.  
Again, the Legislative Council called for submissions, with being received from a range of 
stakeholders, not the least of who were local councils themselves (see Legislative Council 
2015c). The Inquiry also held six public hearings and two public forums, with the ‘Final 
Report’ being published 29 October 2015 (Legislative Council 2015b).The ‘Final Report 
(Legislative Council 2015b: xx-xxii) contained 17 ‘Recommendations’ and nine ‘Findings’. 
Generally, the ‘Recommendations’ pointed to steps that could be taken to assist the local 
government sector in the state – such as approaching the Federal Government to rescind its 




Government withdraw the statements that 71 per cent of councils in metropolitan Sydney 
and 56 per cent of regional councils are ‘unfit’ (Legislative Council 2015b: xx). The ‘Findings’ 
were more critical, asserting inter alia the IPART did not possess the ‘demonstrated skills or 
capacity’ to assess councils beyond their finances (i.e.: ‘as democratically responsible local 
bodies’) and that ‘[t]he projected economic benefits of council amalgamations have been 
consistently overstated by the proponents of forced amalgamations’.  
A notable outcome of the Inquiry has been the investigation of legal challenges to forced 
amalgamations by the NSW Greens under the supervision of Member of the Legislative 
Council (MLC) David Shoebridge. Commissioned legal advice has been widely circulated 
suggesting, in effect, that any government decision to forcibly amalgamate could be 
successfully challenged through a variety of legal avenues (Shoebridge 2015) although the 
eventual outcome of any such a process is highly uncertain (see, for example, Grant, in 
Sansom 2015). 
 
4.5. Greater Sydney Commission (GSC) (2015) 
 
At the time of writing details regarding this particular iteration of a greater metropolitan 
authority are gradually emerging: At 5 June 2015 the NSW Department of Planning and 
Environment (DPE 2015) stated: 
The NSW Government is establishing the Independent Greater Sydney 
Commission to verse the Implementation of A Plan for Growing Sydney.  
The Government is currently working with local councils and other stakeholders 
on how the Commission can best work with them and the community to get 
good outcomes for Sydney. 
The Commission will work closely with local councils and local communities, 
helping Sydneysiders get the most out of their neighbourhoods and suburbs. 
Examining the plan itself (DPE 2014) confines itself to describing the envisioned broad role 
of the GSC, rather than detailing its structure and composition. Nevertheless, this 
envisioned role is bold. A Plan for Growing Sydney describes a hierarchy of plans such that 
the document itself ‘is to be read in conjunction with the Government’s Long Term 
Transport Master Plan and Rebuilding NSW – State Infrastructure Strategy 2014’. Further, 
plans for Sydney’s six districts, as devised ‘in partnership between State Government, local 
councils and the community’ will coalesce underneath the three aforementioned plans (PDE 
2014: 18). The GSC can be described as sitting atop all of these. It is ‘a dedicated new body 
with responsibility to drive delivery of the new plan’ (DPE 2014: 5) and it represents ‘the 
first time a metropolitan entity will take ownership of the delivery of a metropolitan plan’ 
(DPE 2014: 18). 
In addition to this strategic oversight and delivery roles, the authority of the GSC also dips 
down to affect the broad policy areas discussed in A Plan for Growing Sydney. Thus, with 
respect to employment, the DPE (2014: 7) will ‘work with the Greater Sydney Commission to 
develop job targets for strategic centres’; with respect to housing, the GSC will ‘support 




report back to Government on further actions which can stimulate housing and 
development’ (DPE 2014: 65) ; with respect to education, the GSC will ‘[a]ssist the 
Department of Education and Communities [and the various school associations] of NSW to 
identify and plan for new school sites throughout Sydney (DPE 2014: 54)’; and with respect 
to health, the GSC ‘will work with NSW Health to identify planning needs to support future 
health facilities required for Sydney’s growing population… accommodate[ing] new 
technologies and approaches to delivering health care as they emerge’ (DEP 2014: 55).  
Otherwise stated, the envisioned role (at least) for the GSC is both broad and deep: it cuts 
across not only the local government area boundaries in relation to land-use planning 
(arguably, the traditional ambit of state governments in the Australian federation) but is 
also designated a role in major areas of state government service provision (housing; 
education and health) that are nevertheless overlain by significant bureaucracies at the 
federal level, all of which are subject to revision under the current Federal Government’s 
White Paper processes (see, for example, Grant, Ryan and Kelly 2015; Australian 
Government 2015). Nevertheless, A Plan for Growing Sydney envisages both the role of the 
Department of Planning and Environment and the GSC Sydney’s six sub-regions (Central, 
West Central, North, South West, South) rather than a legislatively defined Sydney 
Metropolitan Region as such (see DEP 2014: 108-135). How this is to be reconciled with the 
potential larger councils envisioned as part of the end game of the ‘Fit for the Future’ 




In assessing these contemporary reform processes, the first point to be made is that the 
public policy outcomes are still very much in flux. While both the IPART (2015d) and the 
NSW Legislative Council (2015b) have delivered their ‘Final Reports’, various courses of 
action are available to government, opposition and councils themselves. However, this does 
not proscribe us from making a second general observation, namely that the present drive 
toward both consolidation and metropolitan-wide governance bear a striking resemblance 
to earlier iterations of the same. This places into some relief what we have asserted is the 
‘pervasive modernity’ of ‘Sydney Global City’ understood in a global-regional context, and 
set within a discourse that is both comparative and competitive (i.e.: Sydney versus 
Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, etc.) in which particular policies – principally 
amalgamation and metropolitan-wide governance – are presented as inevitable, as 
exemplified by the rhetoric of the Committee for Sydney and the government, the latter of 
which has consistently proclaimed that Sydney cannot continue to be governed under 
municipal structures that hail back to the ‘horse and cart days’ (see, for example, OLG 2014; 
Toole, in Hansard 2015).  
Admittedly our discussion has placed the overwhelming weight of attention on 
contemporary reform processes at the expense of a more detailed account of earlier 
attempts sketched in Section 2 of the paper. Nevertheless, it is still possible to draw 
comparative observations concerning the sites of institutional conflict for reforming 
Sydney’s governing arrangements. First, the way that the public policy debate has been 




remarkably similar: In 1912 the McGowan Labor Government attempted to engender a 
greater Sydney authority designed by a convention, but the ‘Greater Sydney Convention Bill’ 
was lost ‘because of the [Legislative] Assembly’s refusal to accept the Legislative Council 
amendments related to the above’ (Baine s and Miles 1981: 136). Contemporaneously, the 
opposition parties in the Upper House have overseen an inquiry, ostensibly to exercise 
another layer of due diligence over the reform process but perhaps to stymie the reform 
agenda of the (democratically elected) majority in the Legislative Assembly. Clearly, the 
NSW Parliament is not acting as a whole; rather the Executive, as represented by the 
Ministry and the bodies of state that it directs – the NSW Office (effectively the 
Department) of Local Government and its statutory organisations (in this case, in particular, 
the IPART) – are set against the vocal opposition of the Upper House, which can be readily 
(although not necessarily accurately) seen as acting in the interests of NSW’s 152 
democratically elected councils. In both historical iterations of conflict, it is not the upper 
house as such that has acted as a block to reform, but the fact that there are two houses 
that has resulted in impasses. 
Second, the role of inquiries is also salient: In 1913 the then Labor Government appointed a 
Royal Commission ‘to undertake investigations and recommend a scheme’ (Bains and Miles 
1981: 137) for the transformation of NSW local government, the recommendations of which 
involved both consolidation and a metropolitan authority – the ‘Greater Sydney Council’. 
While this attempt at reform faltered, contemporaneously NSW has witnessed an ‘inquiry 
on an inquiry’ – the Legislative Council inquiring into ‘Fit for the Future’, and the 
assessments of the IPART, the ToRs for which derive from the ILGRP. The logic of such rapid-
fire consecutive processes, the way in which party-political considerations become 
enmeshed with local politics and the role[s] of statutory bodies, as well as the expectations 
surrounding what an inquiry for the purposes of public policy can hope to achieve (see 
Grant, Ryan and Lawrie 2015) are all brought into question. 
Third, in both attempts at reform there is a striking similarity in the yearning for a greater 
metropolitan authority that is responsible for planning the provision of major services: The 
‘Greater Sydney Council’ envisioned by the Royal Commission in 1913 was to designed to 
undertake ‘all functions in the inner zone and all major functions (‘public health, town 
planning, building regulation and main roads’ (Bains and Miles (1981: 137)) across the entire 
region. We have seen that the yet to be implemented Greater Sydney Commission has a 
similarly wide – although as yet fulfilled – ambit.  
Our fourth comparative observation concerns what the Government considers the optimal 
trajectory of reform, namely much larger councils (approximately eighteen) in the SMR 
alongside the putative role of the GSC and – again – the degree to which these twin 
objectives are similar to previous attempts at reform. In the present iteration, how these 
two reforms are envisioned to mesh with one another has not been clearly articulated by 
government, save the implicit assertion that the GSC will have its way. Yet set against the 
interests of not merely larger – and possibly more politically emboldened – councils, and the 
long-standing bureaucracies responsible for health, education and housing, this seems 
somewhat naïve. Our (albeit brief) account of the failure of metropolitan governance for 
Sydney suggests that this will be as a hard reform to implement contemporaneously as it 




Fifth, the earlier attempts at reform and those currently being undertaken focus, almost 
overwhelmingly, on the political conflict between local governments conceived as the basis 
of local democracy on the one hand and the imperatives of state government on the other. 
Yet a moment’s reflection demands that we assess the political consequences beyond 
present state-local relations. It would be naïve to assume that more heavily concentrated 
political authority at the (consolidated) local level would not attract considerably greater 
interest of the political parties and other political actors compared to smaller local 
governments. In this sense, local governments would indeed become ‘glittering prizes for 
would-be mayors and political parties’ (Sansom 2014: 313). However, it is by no means 
equivocal that this is a good thing. For a start, the probity of local government – particularly 
in NSW – is often found to be radically wanting (see, for example, Campbell and Grant 
2015). Bigger councils does not necessarily imply that these organisations will be less prone 
to governance problems. In fact quite the reverse can be envisioned i.e.: where the ‘games’ 
of nefarious local politics are perceived to worth higher risks in terms of improper behaviour 
in order to achieve said ‘glittering prizes’. As well, the same kinds of mistakes that some 
writers have identified as being endemic to local governments (see, for example, Byrnes and 
Dollery 2002) may well still be made but at a significantly magnified scale. 
Sixth, the consequences of significantly diminished layer of local representatives for both 
state and federal politics has to be thought through: On the one hand it is possible to 
envision a smaller, more professionalised class of local politician – and their accompanying 
administrators – filtering through to the ranks of both state and federal politics. Yet this is 
an ideal-type scenario that can be quickly countered with a dystopian one, namely a further 
disenfranchisement from politics writ large due to a disenfranchisement at the local level. 
Indeed, our brief account of early municipal government in NSW, as well as some well-
though generalisations as to the nature of how Australians generally choose to engage with 
their politicians and their bureaucracies (see, in particular, Brown 2006) suggests that to rely 
upon a spirit of voluntarism and engagement at the local level in Australia may not be as 
cogent, nor as intuitively defensible as it appears in other cultural contexts. We need to be 
cognisant that in reforming local government there is more at stake than local government 
itself. 
Seventh, a distinct dissimilarity in the two iterations of reform can be identified. The early 
attempts, particularly that prosecuted in 1898-1900, were characterised by the City of 
Sydney advocating for amalgamations, set against opposition from suburban aldermen. 
Contemporaneously, City of Sydney councillors have actively opposed merger proposals 
(see, for example, ABC News 2015), with the executive of the state government driving the 
case for consolidation.  
Finally, it is possible to envisage a research agenda that excavates the events of early 
attempts toward a metropolitan Sydney authority to the extent that they are rendered 
more directly comparable with contemporary processes. A necessary element of this history 
would be to identify the interests of those arguing for metropolitan government in its 
previous iterations. We suspect that while these interests might be portrayed in terms of 
the coordination and efficiency required for Sydney to function as a successful entrepôt for 
the then rapidly expanding colony, a more critical approach would turn its attention to 
interests perceived in terms of capital and class, and to survey the continuities – and 
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